by George Freeman

Lords reform is like the Stinking Bishop of politics. Despite all the good arguments for why our largely appointed second chamber actually works quite well and should not be a priority for reform, it just won’t go away. New governments continue to feel a political imperative to tackle it, and none more so than the Coalition.

Two constant challenges have bedevilled every government’s programme for Lords reform: designing a reformed chamber which enjoys sufficient renewed legitimacy to be actually ‘reformed’ (but not so much as to threaten the Commons!) and finding a legislative mechanism which is not so confrontational as to threaten the Government’s programme.

Doubtless mindful of the historical precedents, the Prime Minister was rightly fond of describing reform as a ‘third term priority’. But the inevitable logic of this reforming Coalition has brought it back to the fore. Nick Clegg says he wants a reform as bold as enduring as the 1832 Reform Act. Leading and symbolizing a new generation hungry to restore legitimacy and trust to our tarnished politics, David Cameron and Nick Clegg now have to find a way to reform the Lords which is acceptable to both houses of Parliament and makes sense to the public.

Can it be done? If we’re prepared to be bold and seize the opportunity, I believe it could. Here’s a possible model:

There are two keys: process and design. We need a design for a reformed house which is complementary and not competitive to the Commons and a process which is incremental. Big Bang reform has tended to be the salvation of illegitimacy for successive Governments. Liberals will instinctively tend towards radical reform. Conservatives instinctively prefer incrementalism. This is an area of policy where the Coalition can do us all a favor by balancing the Liberal and Conservative instincts into a sensible reform package.

Above all it is critical that any reform is guided by some clearly laid out principles and aims. I would propose three which should be the building blocks of reform:

• To combine enhanced democratic legitimacy for the whole Parliament, not just the Lords, so any reform must deliver a Lords which complements and doesn’t compete with the Commons.
• Form should follow function. We need to spell out the functions of a revising chamber.
• An enduring settlement.

So what would a reformed house look like? How could we design a chamber that is democratically legitimate but doesn’t undermine our parliamentary system by creating a ‘senate’ to oppose the Commons?

1. Form should follow function

Encouragingly, there appears to be consensus on function. All serious commentators agree that we want a revising chamber, with the principle role of scrutinizing legislation, whilst acknowledging the Commons’ primacy as the voice of the electorate; it should be providing wise, restraining counsel in the legislative process, improving the scrutiny of legislation, whilst giving voice to those constituencies which are not well served by the party / constituency system in the Commons.

2. 80:20.

Whilst the aim of the reform would be to give the second chamber the democratic legitimacy it needs, there must be room for a minority of unelected, appointed peers. Why? A serious revising chamber needs to be able to rely on the expertise of people who are either practically or politically unelectable. An element of appointment also helps to reinforce the primacy of the elected Commons and will reinforce the ‘apolitical’ nature of the reformed house which would-be crucial to its success.

3. The reformed house should not be dominated by party politics.

With party affiliation at such a historic low, it would be quite wrong, and a huge missed opportunity, to model a reformed upper house on the basis of party politics. We should be bold and encourage a house with a more colourful and less ideological philosophic foundation, respectful of the centrality of party politics to the mandate of the Commons, but also focused on speaking up for those for whom party politics does not represent.

4. What would be the ‘constituencies’ of these elected representatives?

How would we avoid them competing with MPs at constituency level? The key here is to find a unit of representation that complements rather than competes with MPs. Here is the opportunity to give voice to those small ‘c’ ‘constituencies’ which the narrow party politics of the Commons does not speak well for. These could be elected peers speaking up for our greatest cities and rural counties. Or our universities? Or our main religions? At a time when public faith in our politics this is a wonderful opportunity to refresh, renew and recast our confidence in Parliament as the voice of the people and places which make up our country.

5. Rolling elections.

To ensure that the upper house doesn’t challenge the Common’s mandate to govern for a 5-year term, elections to the upper house should be ‘rolling’ with a proportion of seats elected each year. Whilst the Commons refreshes its mandate to Govern every 5 years with General Elections on the basis of Party Manifestos, the Lords would see a proportion of its members renewed every year, in such a way as to avoid this ‘clash of the mandates’.

6. Fixed terms.
                      
To give them freedom Peers should be elected for fixed terms of 10 years. To stop the risk of Peers using the freedoms of the Upper House to campaign for the Commons, serving in the Lords would be a disqualification from serving in the Commons.

7. How would we ensure legitimate elections?

Rather than get bogged down in the mechanics of how these Peers are elected, we could allow the representative units to choose their own system, and invite the Electoral Commission to ensure the system is valid and properly conducted. Oxford might choose to elect its Peer on a STV system, whilst Oxfordshire chooses to elect its Peer on First Past the post. In the same way that the Mayoral elections in cities up and down the country have triggered a renaissance of city leadership and democratic participation, so this reform could play a crucial role in refreshing our democratic spirit.

8. Where would the Hereditaries fit in?

Whilst its clearly difficult to make the argument for the continuation in perpetuity of an inherited Parliamentary class, we ought to be able to agree on the basis of transitionary continuity if no other than that the existing 92 Peers should be allowed to continue until they expire and/or decide to stand for some other constituency. (I suspect many of our best hereditary Peers would romp home in the sort of election described above in their home ‘constituency’.)

I believe that a reconstituted house on these lines could achieve much of what we are looking for in a reform package. It would go with the grain of the public mood for reform and be an easing of the stranglehold of the political elite. It could open up our politics and give voice to those parts of our country which are not well served by party politics today. Most importantly, it could avoid the clash with the Commons which has bedevilled so many other reform attempts. By acknowledging the primacy of the Commons, this new House of Lords would be locked into fulfilling its role as the voice in parliament of the wider geographical and cultural constituencies we serve. Supported by a small but important group of appointed experts and retired political heavyweights of all parties this could become the revising and restraining chamber we all want to see.

Once we can agree on a model of a revised lords we can begin to move ahead with incremental implementation.

We could start with a bill agreeing the principles of a revising chamber, setting out the intention to evolve to this model over the next, say, 10 years and agreeing upon a mechanism for appointing the 20% and setting up a commission to advise on the 80% element.

Yes, of course there are 101 questions about the practicalities, such as payment and re-election procedure, but we shouldn’t let the inevitable practicalities at this stage preclude a wide discussion of the aims and possibilities of reform.

Let us be bold and imaginative in our aspirations for our democracy.